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E n e r g y
F E R C
Three recent Supreme Court cases addressed the split jurisdiction between state and fed-
eral regulation of the electric grid. Joel Eisen, a professor at the University of Richmond
School of Law, examines the impact of these cases on the rapidly changing energy sector.
The Supreme Court’s New Electricity Federalism
JOEL B. EISEN
I n a remarkable burst of activity, the U.S. SupremeCourt decided three cases in the past year involvingthe split of jurisdiction between the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the states in the
energy sector. FERC v. Electric Power Supply Associa-
tion and Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing dealt with
the relationship between FERC and the states in gov-
erning the electric grid under the Federal Power Act
(FPA). ONEOK v. Learjet involved regulation of natural
gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), which,
being nearly identical to the FPA, also serves as prec-
edent for decisions involving the electric grid.
The impacts of these decisions will reverberate for
years to come. They mark the end of ‘‘dual federalism’’
in electricity law that treated federal and state regula-
tors as operating within separate and distinct spheres of
authority, recognizing instead that state and federal ini-
tiatives frequently overlap. The Court has provided
standards to govern the interaction between FERC and
the states going forward, but has also left considerable
uncertainty. Thus, these watershed decisions herald a
new legal approach to governing the rapid evolution of
the modern electric grid, but one in which the precise
contours will not be known for some time.
This transformative change in electricity law reflects
the tectonic shift occurring today in the electric grid.
For over six decades after the FPA’s enactment in 1935,
the nation’s system of making electricity and delivering
it to customers was stable and predictable. The nation’s
major utilities were vertically integrated monopolies,
much as the phone system once was. Utilities generated
electricity in their power plants, moved it across their
transmission wires, and delivered it to their customers.
State public utility commissions regulated utilities’
rates and services to guard against the ills of monopoli-
zation.
In the grid of 1935, federal jurisdiction could be
fenced off at a state border. This bright line was typical
of the early 20th century’s dual federalism, which pos-
ited that federal and state regulatory authority could be
separated neatly into exclusive spheres. In today’s in-
terconnected electricity network, this no longer makes
sense. A system of shared responsibility is more appro-
priate than a jurisdictional bright line, because both the
states and FERC are taking actions simultaneously to
influence such matters as how many power plants get
built and how much renewable energy is added to the
grid. In this new environment, many state or federal ac-
tions can simultaneously have impacts on both retail
electricity rates and wholesale markets.
Rapidly Changing Electric Grid.
Now, there is change everywhere. Solar and wind
power are being rapidly added to the grid. This power
is generated at the edge of the grid in places like resi-
dential rooftops and remote wind farms, rather than in
central power stations. It requires new transmission
lines, grid connections and advanced management of
increasingly diverse sources of power on the grid to
protect its reliability. New business models, technolo-
gies and upstart competitors, such as solar leasing
firms, are challenging traditional utilities. The utilities
face a challenging environment in which they may
eventually lose customers and perhaps even their long-
protected profitability.
This Insights piece is excerpted from the
article, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead:
But How Dead And What Replaces It?, which
is forthcoming in the George Washington
Journal of Energy and Environmental Law.
The author may be contacted at jeisen@
richmond.edu .
Joel Eisen is a Professor of Law and an Austin
Owen Research Fellow at the University of
Richmond School of Law. He teaches and
writes in the areas of energy law and policy,
environmental law and policy and the smart
grid.
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Debates in well over two dozen states over charges
related to net metering and solar demand highlight
these impacts of the industry shift.
Even more dramatic transformations are on the hori-
zon. Potential game changers like battery storage and
‘‘microgrids’’ (self-sustaining areas largely discon-
nected from the traditional grid) abound. If storage be-
comes more widely available and less expensive than
Tesla’s ‘‘Power Wall,’’ consumers could keep the power
they make from solar panels and provide it back to the
grid when it would be most advantageous for them to
do so. Not far off in the future, electricity may even be
traded among ‘‘prosumers’’ rather than simply pur-
chased by consumers. Recognizing this, California and
New York are experimenting with overhauling the en-
tire system in which electricity is distributed to custom-
ers. The watchword is change, and more of it is prom-
ised.
The grid’s architecture has also changed dramati-
cally. The regional wholesale markets that now trade
over two-thirds of the nation’s electricity under FERC
oversight have been in existence for only fifteen years.
And, as a result of the restructuring (partial deregula-
tion) of the 1990s, another major change took place at
the retail level. Consumers in sixteen states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia can choose to have their electricity de-
livered by suppliers other than their utilities. In Mary-
land, where the events leading to Hughes took place,
roughly one-fourth of all residential customers are
served in this fashion.
Altering the Jurisdictional Boundaries.
The result is a complex and diverse system of elec-
tricity generation, transmission and delivery that is
evolving rapidly. The FPA’s drafters would have consid-
erable difficulty recognizing today’s grid. The statute’s
core provisions, however, are virtually unchanged since
1935, when FDR was a year away from trouncing Alf
Landon, the number one movie was Clark Gable’s Mu-
tiny on the Bounty, and a pound of sugar cost five cents.
Under the FPA, FERC regulates the transmission of
electricity in interstate commerce and rates, terms and
conditions of wholesale sales (any sales that are for re-
sale, that is, not to an eventual consumer). It also has
the power to order a remedy if it finds a ‘‘rule, regula-
tion, practice or contract affecting such [wholesale]
rate’’ to be ‘‘unjust, unreasonable, unduly discrimina-
tory or preferential.’’ The states regulate retail sales to
end users, siting of power plants and transmission lines,
and other matters. This jurisdictional divide between
‘‘wholesale’’ and ‘‘retail’’ reflected congressional intent
to close the ‘‘Attleboro gap,’’ named for the 1927 Su-
preme Court decision that proclaimed that the federal
government regulated sales of electricity that crossed
state lines.
Given this split, the 80-year-old FPA framework still
appears to call for FERC and the states to operate inde-
pendently. In this formalistic reading, it is the last ves-
tige of dual federalism, which is gone from the national
scene in other regulated industries. A modern example
of the shift is environmental law’s ‘‘cooperative federal-
ism,’’ where states and the EPA share responsibility for
implementing environmental laws. The FPA’s bright
line is inappropriate as a jurisdictional test in the mod-
ern grid, and a system of shared, or concurrent federal-
ism, would be more useful. If designed properly, it
would minimize jurisdictional disputes while promoting
federal and state initiatives for innovating on the grid,
protecting reliability and other attributes.
The Supreme Court, however, cannot act simply be-
cause a statute may seem outmoded and ineffective to
deal with today’s realities. Without congressional ac-
tion, of course, the Court could not change the FPA’s
text. Nor could it render an advisory opinion to reinter-
pret the FPA. Under the Constitution, there must be a
case or controversy that the Court can hear. Even that
is no guarantee that the case will find its way to the Su-
preme Court, which controls its docket and takes few of
the cases presented to it. Usually, the Court takes cases
where two or more federal appellate courts have split
on the issues. Hughes featured no circuit split, for two
lower courts agreed about the FPA’s reach. Nor did
FERC v. EPSA, which originated in the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, and ONEOK, which involved a Ninth
Circuit decision without any corresponding decision of
another circuit.
In the absence of a circuit split, the Court often
chooses cases it believes are of utmost national
importance—for example, the Texas challenge to Presi-
dent Barack Obama’s immigration actions currently be-
fore the Court. Here, the Court felt compelled to tackle
three cases that squarely presented variations on the
question introduced above: Which level of government
controls the transition underway in the electric grid? In-
evitably, given the concurrent actions by both levels of
government, conflicts were bound to— and did—arise.
The Court’s decisions addressed these conflicts and
aimed to allocate responsibility for decisions affecting
the grid going forward, within the limitations of statu-
tory language written many years ago.
Impacts of FERC Supreme Court Rulings.
The first of the three decisions was 2015’s ONEOK v.
Learjet, in which Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority
opinion held that the NGA did not preempt actions
taken under state antitrust laws to recover damages for
manipulation of the natural gas market. Natural gas
purchasers claimed that they had been overcharged due
to pipelines’ manipulation that affected prices in both
wholesale and retail markets. The Court was therefore
forced to choose whether FERC or state courts held
sway. Justice Breyer rejected the argument that FERC
had exclusive authority to protect pipeline customers
because ‘‘practices’’ affecting wholesale rates for natu-
ral gas (in this case, the manipulative activities that
raised prices) were exclusively within FERC’s jurisdic-
tion. Instead, he wrote, preemption of state laws must
be determined with reference to ‘‘the target at which
the state law aims in determining whether [the] law is
pre-empted.’’ Because the antitrust laws govern a wide
variety of industries, and not just natural gas pipelines,
the state lawsuits would stand. If, however, the Court
had been presented with a state law that ‘‘aimed di-
rectly at the wholesale markets,’’ the NGA would have
preempted it. There was no further elaboration of what
types of state laws ‘‘aim directly’’ at the wholesale mar-
kets, and more guidance would come later in Hughes.
In FERC v. EPSA, Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a
six-justice majority, upheld a FERC rule requiring that
regional grid operators compensate aggregated bids of
‘‘demand response’’ (reductions in electricity consump-
tion in response to grid emergencies or price signals) at
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the same wholesale market price paid to generators in
the wholesale energy markets. In its rule, FERC recog-
nized that using demand-side measures to reduce peak
stress on the grid can help balance supply and demand,
improve reliability and decrease peak electricity prices.
In the D.C. Circuit, the association representing power
producers had argued successfully that FERC did not
have authority under the FPA to make this rule, and
that demand response was wholly within state jurisdic-
tion because it affected end users.
The Court reversed this decision. It confirmed
FERC’s authority over ‘‘practices’’ affecting wholesale
rates for electricity, stated that demand response was
such a practice, and upheld FERC’s rule. It rejected the
argument that demand response was exclusively a state
matter, finding that adding it to wholesale markets im-
pacted prices in those markets, and that even if its poli-
cies would have impacts on the states and retail elec-
tricity rates, FERC was not foreclosed from acting. The
Court did mention its ‘‘notable solicitude’’ for state de-
mand response programs, and also added that FERC’s
rule allowed a state government to bar firms within its
borders from taking part in wholesale energy markets.
The Court articulated a standard for upholding FERC
initiatives such as this rule: FERC can regulate practices
if wholesale rates are ‘‘directly’’ affected. To the Court,
the demand response rule was a prime example of this
because injecting demand reductions into wholesale
markets immediately impacts wholesale prices. As
opaque as this new test may appear, it has solid ground-
ing in over 100 years of doctrine dating to the federal
regulation of railroads in the early 20th century. And
this decision’s grant of authority, coupled with the well-
recognized limitation that FERC’s initiatives have a ‘‘di-
rect’’ impact on wholesale rates that it sets, yields a
clearer picture of FERC’s role in a system of concurrent
jurisdiction.
Indeed, FERC v. EPSA has enormous implications go-
ing forward, as it gives FERC considerable leeway to
regulate matters affecting the wholesale markets. Con-
sider two examples of how boldly FERC could use its
‘‘directly affecting’’ authority to craft policies for inte-
grating clean and renewable energy into the electric
grid, with environmental benefits such as reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. The first involves a program
that California’s regional grid operator has proposed to
integrate distributed energy resources (DERs) into
wholesale markets. ‘‘DERs’’ are the small-scale re-
sources on the customer side of the electric system,
such as rooftop solar, energy storage, plug-in electric
vehicles and demand response. At present, a rooftop so-
lar owner could not bid his excess electricity into a
wholesale market due to size limits on market partici-
pants and other restrictions. Under the California ‘‘mi-
cro aggregation’’ proposal, this would change. Firms
acting as ‘‘distributed energy resource providers’’
would aggregate mixtures of resources and sell them
into the wholesale markets. This could dramatically ex-
pand the amount of DERs in the California wholesale
markets and create an entire new class of participants
in the grid. A wide variety of firms—electric vehicle
charging stations, demand response companies, home
automation firms and partnerships between battery
storage and solar leasing companies—have expressed
interest in the California proposal.
California consumers would participate directly in
the wholesale markets through these intermediaries,
like the consumers in FERC v. EPSA who bid demand
reductions into wholesale markets. Suppose that after
California gained experience with this program, FERC
believed it was successful and issued a rule that ex-
panded it to other regions. Bids of DERs would directly
impact wholesale rates: Adding new resources to a re-
gional electricity mix would change prices, much as de-
mand response lowered prices directly at times of peak
demand. For that reason, FERC would almost certainly
be acting properly under the new ‘‘directly affecting’’
standard if it expanded DER aggregation. The potential
implications are staggering: In a multi-state region,
FERC could allow a consumer with excess solar power
to effectively sell it to consumers many miles away in a
different state.
FERC could influence an even more dramatic trans-
formation contemplated by California and New York
(the latter in its ‘‘Reforming the Energy Vision’’ pro-
ceeding) that would establish ‘‘distribution system op-
erators’’ (DSOs). These entities would fit between grid
operators and customers, and coordinate a wide variety
of activities, including the interface between DERs and
the transmission system, and potentially all dispatch
(determining which power generating units operate to
serve customers). This function might be handled by
existing utilities, as under certain iterations of the New
York proposal, or by new, independent entities. Any ex-
change of electricity between a grid operator and a
DSO would be a FERC-jurisdictional wholesale transac-
tion, and FERC would have jurisdiction over other as-
pects of DSO operations under its ‘‘directly affecting’’
authority. In the long run, we might well see FERC
adopt an ‘‘open access distribution tariff’’ specifying
terms and conditions for this interaction, similar to the
open access tariffs that govern access to the nation’s
transmission lines.
One set of issues FERC v. EPSA left unaddressed in-
volved how far the states could go in influencing the
grid’s future direction, when their actions might impact
the wholesale markets. This issue arose in Hughes in
the context of a Maryland law that provided incentives
for a new power plant to locate in the state. The state
tied its incentive to prices in the ‘‘capacity’’ market that
the PJM regional transmission organization, the grid
operator in the region that includes Maryland, has op-
erated since 2007. Capacity markets came into exis-
tence when regional planners recognized that electric-
ity market prices alone would not prompt construction
of new power plants. The PJM capacity market, for ex-
ample, is designed to provide additional payments to
generators that commit to sell power into PJM over the
next three years.
Maryland officials believed these payments were in-
sufficient to induce construction of new power plants in
the state. The resulting state law created a ‘‘contract for
differences’’ between the winning bidder and load-
serving entities (LSEs, the term for utilities and retail
suppliers that serve customers). If the contract price ex-
ceeded the capacity market price, LSEs would pay the
difference to the plant owner. Because PJM already re-
quires LSEs to purchase capacity for the demand they
serve, the LSEs could therefore pay a premium above
the market price. A group of challengers claimed this
interfered with pricing in the wholesale markets, and
the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. It found
that the doctrine of field preemption applied, conclud-
ing that FERC’s regulation of wholesale markets under
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the FPA is so all-encompassing that it leaves no room
for a state law.
As Hughes reached the Court, many observers be-
lieved that it would reject the lower court’s field pre-
emption approach. If upheld, FERC would have power
to void all state initiatives that might impact the whole-
sale markets, no matter how substantial the impacts
and how legitimate the states’ goals might be. That is
too imbalanced and blunt an instrument to govern the
federal-state relationship. Some believed the Court
would adopt a ‘‘conflict preemption’’ approach, under
which a state law falls only if it conflicts with the intent
of the federal statute.
Instead, the Court avoided crafting a broad principle
that articulated which state initiatives would and would
not conflict with the FPA. It issued a narrow decision
that, like FERC v. EPSA, hewed closely to the statutory
text. The Court overturned the Maryland law because it
interfered with the system of setting wholesale rates
through the capacity auctions. The Maryland program
took the market payment as an input and gave the
power plant owner the ability to change it. It allowed
the owner to consider the subsidy and therefore bid dif-
ferently into the market, which, the Court stated, would
distort the market design and ‘‘disregards’’ the whole-
sale rate. Notwithstanding the Court’s rote enunciation
of preemption principles, this decision was grounded
solely in an interpretation of the statute. This was evi-
denced in Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurring opin-
ion stating that she agreed with the majority decision
on that basis.
The Court cautioned that it was only rejecting this
particular subsidy program:
Our holding is limited: We reject Maryland’s pro-
gram only because it disregards an interstate
wholesale rate required by FERC. We therefore
need not and do not address the permissibility of
various other measures States might employ to en-
courage development of new or clean generation,
including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsi-
dies, construction of state-owned generation facili-
ties, or re-regulation of the energy sector. Nothing
in this opinion should be read to foreclose Mary-
land and other States from encouraging produc-
tion of new or clean generation through measures
‘‘untethered to a generator’s wholesale market
participation.’’ So long as a State does not condi-
tion payment of funds on capacity clearing the auc-
tion, the State’s program would not suffer from the
fatal defect that renders Maryland’s program unac-
ceptable.
This language, taken together with Justice Sotomay-
or’s concurrence and Justice Kagan’s ‘‘notable solici-
tude’’ for the states in FERC v. EPSA, demonstrates the
Court’s reluctance to fashion a sweeping jurisdictional
bright line. However, it leaves considerable uncertainty
about what state actions are now allowed. Any other
state incentive directly conditioned on expected market
revenues would be as suspect as the Maryland program
Hughes rejected, as the Court itself recognized shortly
thereafter in refusing to hear an appeal of a 3rd Circuit
decision voiding a similar New Jersey law.
What state incentives might survive judicial scrutiny?
Consider one recognized by the Court itself — a state’s
tax incentive. Suppose Maryland gave a power plant
owner a complete exemption from local property and
other taxes. If it tied the incentive to making up a short-
fall in market payments, this would likely be invalid. On
the other hand, if it did not do so, the incentive would
not be ‘‘tethered’’ (linked) to wholesale market partici-
pation (property taxes themselves do not ‘‘aim directly’’
at the market, in the language of ONEOK) and might be
permissible. But it might have the same market distort-
ing impact as Maryland’s contract for differences
mechanism if it provided the same amount of savings.
The state could request that FERC approve the initia-
tive, but that may not be likely if it impacts the whole-
sale markets. This example demonstrates that the laun-
dry list of state initiatives the Court appears to endorse
probably raises more questions than it answers.
Several Conclusions From These Cases.
Prior to ONEOK, FERC v. EPSA and Hughes, more
than five years had elapsed since the Court had issued
any decision involving the electric grid, much less three
in the span of one year. Taken as a whole, several con-
clusions may be drawn from these cases. First, FERC
has sweeping authority to transform the electric grid
under the ‘‘directly affecting’’ test, subject to certain
limitations. The states can take actions under broad-
based statutes, such as antitrust and tax laws, and can
pursue their own energy goals as long as their initia-
tives do not directly target FERC-jurisdictional whole-
sale rates.
Second, these decisions mark the end of dual federal-
ism in electricity law because it can no longer be said
that federal and state actions are disconnected. Instead,
the Court has recognized, in all three cases, that the two
levels of government are now interconnected for the
foreseeable future. FERC v. EPSA’s ‘‘directly affecting’’
standard and Hughes’ invalidation of the Maryland con-
tract for differences give FERC authority while preserv-
ing latitude for states to act. Thus, both may act simul-
taneously even if it impacts the other: FERC may act
even if it impacts retail rates, and the states can act if
they don’t ‘‘disregard’’ wholesale rates.
Finally, the jurisdictional division of responsibility
between FERC and the states is now a matter of experi-
mentation rather than a system governed by hard and
fast rules. While the Court has given FERC the green
light to act boldly, it is demonstrably uncomfortable
with sorting out all of the potential consequences for
the states. Hughes and ONEOK set overarching prin-
ciples and allow for case-by-case determination of state
interference with the federal scheme, rather than aspir-
ing to doctrinal precision. ‘‘Aiming at the wholesale
market,’’ ‘‘untethered to a generator’s wholesale mar-
ket participation,’’ and ‘‘condition on participation in
the wholesale market’’ are words likely to guide federal
courts for years to come.
In the absence of yet another Supreme Court decision
clarifying its new positions on electricity federalism,
more guidance is not likely to be forthcoming. This lan-
guage offers little predictability, and states will have to
either vet their statutory and regulatory initiatives with
FERC or run the risk of litigation. As Professor Emily
Hammond of the George Washington University Law
School recently observed, ‘‘The difficulty is that Hughes
doesn’t really tell us which state initiatives will survive
future Supremacy Clause challenges, and which will
fail. We are likely now in the position of awaiting ‘Take
Four.’ ’’ In states whose utilities do not participate in or-
ganized wholesale markets, of course, the principles of
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traditional electricity regulation will continue to apply
as before.
One conclusion implicit in all three of these decisions
is that there is no need for a new or revamped Federal
Power Act. While modern challenges seemed to have
stressed this venerable statute near its conceptual
breaking point, it has demonstrated its remarkable flex-
ibility to handle today’s challenges. Wisely, the Court
appears to recognize that the FPA governs a complex,
highly technical and rapidly evolving industry, that the
Court lacks the expertise of federal and state regula-
tors, and that it might make a serious misstep if it did
more to precisely define how the FPA should govern the
federal-state relationship going forward. But there has
been no suggestion that statutory overhaul is necessary.
On the contrary, the Court has relied explicitly on the
statutory text to address matters never foreseen in
1935. To the Court, the FPA remains a solid foundation
on which to build a robust, modern electric grid.
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